Matt Yglesias Is Right and Wrong

As Matt Yglesias discussed a few days ago, he has a problem with public choice economics:

While of course I agree with many of the specific observations made under the banner of public choice (public officials often do corrupt and self-interested things), I don’t really “get” public choice and think I never will. The basic theory [...] seems to go like this:

1) Spread cynicism about public officials.
2) …
3) Libertarianism!

The psychological and sociological links here seem clear enough. Both libertarian political ideology and spreading cynicism about public officials serve to raise the status of businessmen and lower the status of politicians and bureaucrats. But as a political agenda it doesn’t work at all.

He goes on to provide plenty of good reasons why cynicism is problematic as a guiding principle for political decisions. He's right.

But he's completely wrong in thinking that what he's talking about is public choice economics. Perhaps a trip to Wikipedia could have cleared this up. Public choice is not a political agenda. It's descriptive, applying the analytical tools of economics to the decision-making process of political bodies. It's core premise is that politicians are no less (and no more!) oriented toward their own best interests than any other human being.

It's true that public choice is often used as a part of the case for libertarianism, but only because advocates all too often assume that politics has the uncanny ability to attract only the most altruistic idealists into its ranks. Public choice makes the case, rather, that political institutions can just as easily attract those seeking economic rents... or at the very least those whose motives look very like the motives of any other consumer or firm manager.

So Yglesias is right that if we are trying to tell political figures how they can look out for the well-being of society we shouldn't expect public choice economics to give us the answers. But then we wouldn't offer advice on generating bigger externalities to polluters, either. If we want to be able to predict how the political system will deal with something, though, we might want to model the actual decision-makers, and public choice provides an under-utilized means of doing that. For that matter, if we want to construct institutions that limit the ability of politicians to indulge their self-interest, public choice can help us there, too, although it will also tell us why such institutional changes are difficult to achieve.

In the end, it seems like what Matt Yglesias doesn't really get is the difference between prescriptive policy and descriptives science.